decided by reason gives us grounds for thinking that here there must ultimately be only a single principle. For this means that we must suppose there is an objective answer to them, an answer valid for all possible agents or inquirers (whether or not we are ever able to find that answer or agree on it) (Groundwork 4:442, Morals 6:207; cf. Lectures on Ethics 27: 276, 29:621, 625-626). It is familiar enough in everyday life, of course, that moral considerations are sometimes plural and mutually conflicting, but if there were no single principle to which they could be traced back, then necessarily there would be no objectively correct answer to moral questions whenever opposing answers could be made to rest each on its own ultimate, incommensurable principle. In that case is not even clear that we could consider the different answers conflicting answers to the same question, or consider there to be a specifically moral point of view, or even any determinate moral questions at all, since each of the irreducible plurality of principles would define a distinct practical viewpoint and a distinct set of practical questions, and no communication would be possible between these points of view concerning what, in the end, we ought to do or how we ought to live. This would spell the end of all moral objectivity, perhaps even of all morality, period.
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That there is a supreme principle of morality, however, does not mean that there cannot be moral questions that are difficult to decide in practice, or that there must be an easy resolution to all moral conflicts and dilemmas. Nor does it mean that moral decisions are always, or even typically, to be made by referring them directly to the supreme principle. This is the mistake made by all those who think of Kantian ethics as recommending that we make all our decisions merely by applying Kant's famous formula of universal law, asking ourselves "What if everybody did that?" Kant may have let himself in for such a mistaken reading when he said:
Thus I need no well-informed shrewdness to know what I have to do in order to make my volition morally good. Inexperienced in regard to the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all occurrences that might eventuate in it, I ask myself only: Can you will also that your maxim should become a universal law?" (Groundwork 4:403).
However, the context of this remark must be carefully considered. Kant's only aim in the passage is to draw a clear distinction between the prudential question whether it is safe to make a false promise for immediate gain and the moral question whether it is permissible to do so. He has just been observing that whether it is in our long-term self-interest to make a false promise is often a nice question, hard to decide on account of the conflicting considerations of momentary advantage and possible long-term risk. His point in this remark is that the same subtleties do not afflict the question whether it is morally right to make a false promise, since he thinks it is obvious that we could not rationally will that others should be allowed to perpetrate such deceptions on us, or fail to believe our promises --as they obviously would if everyone were permitted to adopt the policy of making any promise they liked with no intention of keeping it. It is not at all clear, however, that the obvious generalization suggested by Kant's remark is true, or is anything he would want to support. About many decisions made every day in the business world, for example (in particular, decisions about how far to be wholly frank with people and when to let them act on false beliefs) it is easy to see that these decisions are both safe and profitable, but a subtle and difficult question whether they are morally right. We would seriously misunderstand Kant's ethics if we concluded from this passage that he has some deep theoretical reason for wanting to deny this obvious fact. The fact even further supports his main conclusion by showing another way moral questions can be easily distinguished from prudential questions.
Even more harmful and misleading, however, is the extremely common thought that Kant is recommending here that every decision we make in life should be prompted by asking ourselves whether some maxim or other can be willed as a universal law. This thought is responsible for so many misunderstandings, and there are so many things wrong with it, that it is hard even to know which ones to list first. This thought ignores the fact that, as we shall see below, the formula of universal law is only the first step in the process of formulating the supreme principle of morality, and consequently ignores Kant's other, richer and more definitive formulations of this principle. It does not consider that the formula of universal law provides only a negative test for maxims (a way of rejecting some as impermissible), but could never tell us in positive terms that we ought to follow any specific maxim. It disregards the fact that Kant never presents, and never uses, the formula of universal law as a general moral decision procedure. In any case, although the universalizability test may be suited to illustrate the specific examples to which Kant applies it, it would be radically defective as a general moral criterion, since it systematically yields both false positives and false negatives when we try to employ it generally. 2 Against the general thought that the supreme principle of morality is to be used directly to make moral decisions, what is said by J. S. Mill might just as well have been said by Kant: "It is a strange notion that the acknowledgement of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones…Men really ought to leave off talking nonsense on this subject, which they would neither talk nor listen to on other matters of practical concernment… Whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we require subordinate principles to apply it by; the impossibility of doing without them, being common to all systems, can afford no argument against any one in particular." 3 In the case of Kant, he indicates clearly that the supreme principle of morality requires for its application a "practical anthropology" (Groundwork 4:388), so that we may determine what this highest principle --so abstract and removed from ordinary decisionmaking that the search for and establishment of it must "constitute an enterprise whole in its aim and to be separated from every other moral investigation" -requires of us under the actual conditions of human life. When we turn to Kant's actual account of ordinary moral reasoning in the Doctrine of Virtue, we see that it turns not on figuring out which maxims are universalizable, but on reasoning from a system of duties --juridical and ethical, to ourselves and others, of respect and of love. Some of these duties are "perfect,"
"narrow" or "strict", requiring particular actions or omissions from us; most of them, however, are "imperfect," "wide" and "meritorious", requiring only that we set certain ends, and leaving it up to us to decide the priority among them and the specific actions that we will take toward them. Kant clearly recognizes that there can be conflicts between the different "obligating reasons" that arise from our various ends (MS 6: 224), and he worries a good deal (under the heading of 'Casuistical Questions') about cases in which special circumstances might make it necessary to modify or make exceptions even to moral rules that are taken to be of strict obligation (see Morals 6:423-424, 426, 428, 431).
The role of a supreme principle of morality is not to dictate what we do in every particular case, but rather to stand behind and justify such a system of general moral rules or duties, and to provide a general rationale for deciding cases where reasons derived from them either collide, or leave it indeterminate what to do, or require us to make alterations in their demands to fit unusual situations. We would look in vain in the Metaphysics of Morals for any rigorous inferential route from the supreme principle of morality (in any of its formulations) to the specific duties Kant identifies. Only one of them is based on anything like the formula of universal law; all the others rest on appeals, usually both brief and casual, to the formula of humanity as end itself. 4 But it is clear enough how the system reflects the general ideas of rational autonomy, the dignity of every rational being as an end in itself, and the laws by which every human being could rationally will that all should conduct themselves.
The function of a supreme principle of morality, then, is not to tell us directly, from day to day and minute to minute, through some uniform canonical process of moral reasoning to be applied in exactly the same way to all situations, exactly which actions we should (and should not) be performing and precisely how we should be spending our time. In this respect, we ought to ask far less of a supreme principle of morality than philosophers are in the habit of asking. But in another respect, we ought to ask a good deal more of such principles than is often asked. Analytical philosophers often aim at producing moral principles that may be very complex in structure, full of subclauses and qualifications, because these principles enable them to capture "our moral intuitions" and the precisely worded epicyclic subclauses enable us to deal cleverly with threatened counterexamples of various kinds. (Kant's Formulas of Universal Law and the Law of Nature, when subjected to sophisticated interpretations that are intended to deal with all the troublesome counterexamples, are easily twisted into a principles of this kind.) But the resulting principles often do more to disguise than to state the fundamental value basis on which decisions are to be made. The right interpretation of Kant's formulation of the supreme principle of morality, by contrast, will be one that exhibits the principle as less concerned with generating results for all cases that accord precisely with our socalled 'intuitions', and more concerned with identifying perspicuously the ultimate value on which moral rules and duties may be grounded.
Formulating the Supreme Principle
In the Groundwork, Kant formulates the supreme principle of morality in conscious contrast to what he sees as the entire philosophical tradition of thinking on the topic.
Further, in the twentieth century there was one interesting attempt to interpret the Groundwork as a conscious response to one influential historical text, namely Cicero's On Duties, especially as it had recently been interpreted by Kant's contemporary Christian Garve. But it will prove to be more perspicuous if we postpone such historical reflections until after an exposition of the procedure through which Kant develops his formulations of the supreme principle.
Duty and respect for law. Kant develops the moral principle twice in the
Groundwork, using first a more commonsensical starting point in the First Section, then a more philosophical starting point in the Second Section, leading to a more complete formulation. In the first section, the starting point is "common rational moral cognition."
The aim here is to enlist what Kant regards as certain of our most deeply held rational beliefs about morality on behalf of his new conception of the moral principle. He begins by focusing on the 'good will' which, he claims, we recognize as good in itself, and having a special place among goods in that it is the only thing good in itself whose goodness cannot be augmented or diminished by its combination with other good or bad things. Kant then attempts to forge a special connection between the good will and the idea of 'acting from duty' -that is, acting with inner rational moral constraint, motivated solely by the thought of following a moral principle. The crucial claim is that we think there is something uniquely worthy of esteem about a person who fulfills duty in the absence of (or even in opposition to) all other inducements of inclination or self-interest, solely out of respect for the moral law.
In light of over two hundred years of lively controversy over Kant's assertions in the opening pages of the Groundwork, it is hard to resist the thought that Kant overestimated the extent to which the truth of his claims is available to all of us through 'common rational moral cognition'. Our purpose here, however, is to see how he uses these claims to derive a formulation of the supreme moral principle. His central argument is that when we act from duty, even in opposition to all inclination, the only thing left that could motivate us is the purely rational appeal of a universally valid practical principle.
This leads him to his first formulation of what we may call the Formula of Universal Law (FUL): "I ought never to conduct myself except so that I could also will that my maxim become a universal law" (Groundwork 4:402). In other words, the special motive of duty, which has a special affinity with the good will because it alone can rationally constrain us to a course of action even in opposition to all our empirical desires or inclinations, can be nothing else but the unconditional worth of following a principle that binds us solely on account of its source in our own rational willing -in the fact that we regard it as a principle fit for being legislated to ourselves merely as rational beings, hence for being legislated universally to all rational beings.
Although Kant uses these thoughts only to reach FUL, they contain at least implicitly all the main ideas he goes on to develop, resulting in an entire system of different (yet, he argues, essentially equivalent) formulas of the supreme principle of morality. This more systematic exposition of the supreme principle of morality takes place in the Second Section of the Groundwork.
The Categorical Imperative. Crucial to the Second Section's formulation of the principle is the idea of a 'categorical imperative,' which can best be understood in connection with an entire philosophical theory of rational agency, presented very succinctly by Kant at Groundwork 4:412-421.
Kant's theory takes us to be agents who are self-directing in the sense that we have the capacity to step back from our natural desires, reflect on them, consider whether and how we should satisfy them, and to be moved by them only on the basis of such
reflections. An inclination (or habitual desire we find in ourselves empirically) moves us to act only when we choose to set its object as an end for ourselves, and this choice then sets us the task of selecting or devising a means to that end. If I see an apple up in a tree and a desire to eat it occurs to me, then I will eat it only if I first decide to make eating it my end, and then devise a means (such as climbing the tree, or reaching for the apple with a stick, or knocking it to the ground by throwing something at it) to achieve the end.
In acting on my inclination, I thus make a series of decisions and create in myself a set of new desires (to climb the tree, or find a suitable stick) whose source is not merely the original desire I am trying to satisfy, but even more the exercise of my own capacities to set ends, devise means, and hold myself to some self-chosen plan for applying the means.
Our desires, then, do not simply push us around like the levers and pulleys of a machine, but rather provide inputs into a rational process of self-direction involving our adoption and recognition of rational norms and the decision to follow or not follow the norms we recognize.
Setting an end is the most basic normative act, since (Kant holds) there is no action without an end to be produced by it. This act involves the concept of an object (or state of affairs) to be produced and also the concept of some means needed to produce it. Setting an end thus subjects me to a normative principle commanding me to perform the action required as a means to the end. Kant calls this principle a 'hypothetical imperative'. It is called an 'imperative' because it is a command of reason requiring the agent to do something; it is 'hypothetical' because the command governs our action only on the condition that we will the end in question. By contrast, an imperative that has no such condition would be called a 'categorical imperative'.
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Kant thinks that if the good will that acts from duty has the characteristic that it follows a rational principle even when all empirical incentives oppose it, then such a will should be understood as following a categorical imperative. For to act from duty is to follow a moral principle whether or not doing so achieves some antecedently desired end. 6 Therefore, if acting from duty is what is most essential to morality, then the moral law should also be characterized as a categorical imperative. Thus the supreme principle of morality, whatever else it is, must be conceived as a categorical imperative.
First Formula: Universal Law and the Law of Nature. As these considerations might lead us to expect, Kant now proceeds to derive essentially the same formula we saw at the end of the First Section, namely the Formula of Universal Law (FUL), which is now stated as: "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law" (Groundwork 4:421). By a 'maxim', Kant means a normative principle, which a subject lays down for itself with the intention of acting according to it. It perhaps involves a degree of idealization to represent agents as acting on 'maxims', since people do not typically recite to themselves (even silently) some general principle on which they are acting before they act. But the degree of idealization involved is not so great, when we consider that understanding an action at all normally involves understanding the agent's intention, and the intention with which an agent acts is essentially such a subjectively adopted norm, usually also permitting us to
form generalizations about what actions, consistent with this intention, the agent will perform or would perform under various counterfactual circumstances.
FUL provides us with a test for permissibility of maxims. It tells us that it is permissible to act only on those maxims we could will to be universal laws. The criterion of possibility here seems to be the absence of contradiction or conflicting volitions. It is not possible for me to will my maxim as a universal law if I cannot consistently think both of myself acting successfully on the maxim and also of its being a universal law, or if the volition that the maxim be a universal law would conflict either with the volition to act on the maxim or else with some other volition that I, as a rational being, necessarily have.
The term 'universal law', as used in FUL, appears also to carry a normative force.
That is, the question we are asking about our maxim is whether we could will that everyone (at least, everyone in our present circumstances) should be permitted to act on it. This is clearly the way Kant applies FUL in the First Section to the maxim of making the false promise: "Would I be able to say that anyone may make an untruthful promise when he finds himself in embarrassment which cannot get out of in any other way" (Groundwork 4:403). In other words, FUL invites us to consider which maxims we can will to be morally permissible for all, and commands us to restrict ourselves only to those maxims.
Apparently, however, Kant thinks it is easier (or more intuitive) to apply a different permissibility test to maxims, asking ourselves not which ones we can will to be universally permissible, but rather which ones we can will to be actually followed as . That is, we are to imagine a world in which, with the regularity of a natural law, the maxim we are considering is followed by everyone (in relevantly similar circumstances to the ones we are in). FLN, not FUL, is the formula Kant actually uses in illustrating his first formulation with reference to the four much discussed examples, organized according to the taxonomy of duties through which Kant structures his more fully developed moral theory (that is, duties to ourselves and to others, perfect duties and imperfect duties).
Once Kant has completed his exposition of the supreme principle of morality, he tells us that the three formulas he has developed represent the moral principle from three different points of view: "form," "matter," and "complete determination" (Groundwork 4:436). 7 The version of the first formula he identifies with "form" is again FLN: "That the maxims must be chosen as if they are supposed to be valid as universal laws of nature" (Groundwork 4:436). Both FUL and FLN may be regarded as identifying the "form" of the supreme principle of morality in the sense that they seek to specify a formal
property of maxims such that having that property makes them compatible with the moral principle. This form consists in a certain relation to the rational will of the agent who proposes to act on the maxim, namely, the capacity of that agent to will that the maxim be a universal law of nature (or, in the FUL version, to will that its universal permissibility should be a valid norm for all rational beings). For example, Kant's entire approach to ethics has been (and still is) widely described as 'formalistic'. He has been criticized for not providing (or even for not allowing the possibility of) any substantive value lying behind the moral principle, or
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providing the rational will with any ground for being able to will one maxim, and not another, to be a universal law (or law of nature). The very concept of a categorical imperative has sometimes been rejected as nonsensical, on the ground that this concept precludes our having any substantive reason for obeying such an imperative.
Schopenhauer, for instance, explained the alleged incoherence of Kant's thinking by attributing to him an ethics of divine command but without admitting a divine lawgiver to back up the command.
moral principle, and also the traditional conception of the sorts of things that can count as ends of human action. This radically new conception of the fundamental end of morality perhaps explains the incredulity that has often greeted the Groundwork on this point. The traditional view, namely, is that what grounds any principle must be an end to be produced, a state of affairs whose desirability gives us a reason to follow principles whose execution is conducive to bringing it about. As we have already noted, Kant accepts the traditional idea that every action has an end to be produced, but insists that the setting of such ends must be consequent on moral principles, not their ground. He rejects the thesis that any end to be produced grounds the supreme principle of morality,
arguing that this would turn the principle into a merely hypothetical imperative, and deprive it of its status as a categorical imperative. The question then is: What sort of substantive value could give us reason to follow a principle without appealing to any end to be produced by following it?
Kant's answer to this question is found in the following remark, presented first in the form of a mere supposition: "But suppose there were something whose existence in itself had an absolute worth, something that, as an end in itself, could be a ground of determinate laws; then in it and only in it alone would lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative, i.e. of a practical law" (Groundwork 4:428). In other words, the substantive value grounding a categorical imperative cannot be the value of something future to be brought about as a consequence of our obeying it, but rather the value of something already in existence, which grounds our obedience to the imperative because such obedience serves to manifest or express our recognition of that value. Such an existent value is an end in the sense that it is that for the sake of which it is rational for us to act.
Going beyond the mere supposition of something with this sort of value, Kant next presents his thesis in the form of an assertion: "Now I say that the human being, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in itself" (Groundwork 4:428). He then proceeds immediately to support the assertion by presenting, first, in a series of arguments eliminating other possible candidates for what might exist as an end in itself:
the objects of empirical desires or inclinations, the inclinations themselves, nonrational beings (Groundwork 4:428). He follows this up with a brief, obscure but crucial positive argument that only 'humanity' understood in the technical Kantian sense of rational nature regarded as the capacity to set ends, can qualify as an end in itself: However we interpret this argument, the gist of it seems to be that we do rationally value our own existence as an end in itself, but we do so rationally only insofar as we value the existence of other rational beings in precisely the same way.
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Rational nature as an existent end in itself is distinct from all ends to be produced, but it stands in a determinate relation to them. All ends to be produced are set as ends by rational beings, since only rational nature has the capacity to regulate itself by rational norms, the most basic of which is the setting of ends and the selection of means to them (Groundwork 4:437). There are, in Kant's theory, two basic kinds of ends to be produced that the supreme principle of morality requires us to set: our own perfection and the happiness of others (Morals 6:386-388, 391-394; cf. Groundwork 4:423, 430).
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Regarded from the standpoint of its 'matter', then, the supreme principle of morality rests on the absolute worth of rational nature in the person of each human being, and leads to the second main formula of the moral principle, the Formula of Humanity as
End in Itself (FH): "Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means"
(Groundwork 4:429). As I have already mentioned, this is the formula of the moral law to which Kant most consistently appeals when he derives the duties belonging to the system he expounds in the Metaphysics of Morals.
Third Formula: Autonomy and the Realm of Ends. Kant has now derived two distinct formulas of the supreme principle of morality, both from the concept of a categorical imperative. The first was derived from the concept of a maxim that is compatible with this kind of imperative, and the general form that such a maxim would have to have. The second was derived from the concept of the substantive value (or the end) that could give us a rational ground to follow a categorical imperative. These two lines of argument from the concept of a categorical imperative are quite independent of each other, and lead to distinct formulations of the moral principle, even if (as Kant thinks) there is no conflict between these distinct formulas, and they can be treated as merely different ways of expressing "precisely the same law" (Groundwork 4:436).
Kant's next step, however, is to combine the two ideas behind these first two formulas to derive a third formula:
"The ground of all practical legislation, namely, lies objectively in the rule and the form of universality, which makes it capable of being a law (at least a law of nature) (in accordance with the first principle), but subjectively it lies in the end; but the subject of all ends is every rational being as an end in itself (in accordance with the second principle): from this now follows the third practical principle of the will, as the supreme condition of its harmony with universal practical reason, the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law" (Groundwork 4:431).
The third formula combines the conception of a law valid universally for all rational beings (in FUL) with the conception of every rational nature as having absolute worth, to get the idea of the will of every rational being as the source of a universally valid legislation. The term 'idea' used in this formulation should be understood in Kant's technical sense: an 'idea' is a concept of reason to which no empirical object can ever
correspond, but which we use regulatively in arranging our cognitions in a system (Pure Reason A312-320/B368-377, A642-704/B670-732). Thus to regard the legislator of the moral law as the idea of the will of every rational being is not to say that the law is given by your arbitrary will or mine (for our wills are corrupt and fallible), but rather that the law is regarded as having been legislated by each of our wills insofar as it corresponds to an ideal rational concept of what it ought to be (but always falls short of being).
"The idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law" is Where FUL and FLN provide a mere condition of permissibility for maxims, consisting in its being possible (without contradiction or conflicting volitions) for you to will the maxim as a universal law, FA tells you positively to follow those maxims which actually contain in themselves the volition that they should be universal laws. FUL (or respectively, FLN) counts a maxim as permissible if there would be no contradiction or conflicting volitions in willing it to be a universal law (or law of nature); but a maxim might pass this purely negative test without containing in itself the volition that it should actually be a universal law (or law of nature). So the criterion on maxims proposed in FA is significantly stronger than the criteria of universalizability proposed in either FUL or FLN. And it justifies a correspondingly stronger conclusion about maxims, telling us not merely which ones are permissible and which not, but also which ones we have a positive duty to adopt because they are part of a system of universal moral legislation given by our own rational will.
Of course FA does not pretend to offer us any test to discriminate maxims that have this property from maxims that do not. But as I have already said, it would be error to think that the universalizability tests present in FUL or FLN are intended (even as permissibility tests) to apply to all conceivable maxims, so there is really nothing they can do that FA cannot. Both FUL and FA, rather, should be seen as indicating the spirit of a universal moral principle, and defining a task for reasoning: namely, in the case of FUL, that of deciding which maxims are compatible with a system of universal law (which maxims do not violate the laws of such a system), or, in the case of FA, which ones belong to that system as part of its actual legislation as given by the idea of the will of every rational being. The main point Kant seems to be making here is that the way of thinking (closer to "intuition" and "feeling") that is best for animating human hearts and actions on behalf of morality is not the same as the way of thinking that is best when it comes time to pass critical judgment either on the actions we have performed or on the maxims we are proposing to adopt. For this latter task, apparently, a more austere and abstract principle is better, because, flawed human nature being what it is, the same feelings and intuitions that may make us enthusiastic friends of virtue also make us more susceptible to selfdeception and make it easier for us to pass off corrupt actions and maxims as morally commendable ones. (In other words, those sentimentalists who think that what satisfies the heart, but not the head, represents greater moral purity, have things exactly wrong:
where the head has been corrupted, it was the heart that corrupted it; and the first remedy for the corruption of our hearts is to learn to think in an enlightened way, with our heads, about what to do, and which feelings we should allow to influence us.)
In light of the systematization of the three formulations of the moral principle Kant has just presented, however, what are we to make of his reference to "the universal formula of the categorical imperative"? Is this intended to be the same as one of the other formulas already derived? The most common interpretation is that the "universal formula" is FUL (perhaps because "universal formula" is, carelessly, thought to be (equally careless) shorthand for "formula of universal law"). Most who adopt this reading do so as if it were not the least bit problematic, as though it were simply what the text itself says. 14 But of course it is not. I fear this is reflex reaction on the part of even many distinguished commentators is due to the pernicious influence of the traditional but deeply false idea that FUL is the primary (or in fact even the only real) Kantian formula of the moral principle.
Another (deeper and more interesting) thought, is presented by Klaus Reich (in an article whose main contentions we will be examining in the next section). This is that the "general" (or "universal" -allgemein) formula is yet a fourth (or a "sixth") formula, distinct from all the "particular" formulas derived earlier in the Second Section and then in what way it is more "general" than the formulas already derived and explained.
Surely it is more natural to suppose, as the most common interpretation does, that the "universal formula" is one of the formulas already derived. The question, though, is:
Which one? There seem to me several reasons for thinking that it is to be identified not with FUL, but with FA. For one thing, the "universal" formula occurs in the same paragraph devoted to FRE (which is the more "intuitive" version of FA). Then too, as we have seen, FA is the formula that combines the other two in itself, and in which, in that sense, the search for the supreme principle of morality culminates. which is the best standard to be used in moral judging, is FA.
Kant's Groundwork and Cicero's De officiis.
Having now examined Kant's attempt to develop a formulation of the supreme principle of morality, we turn next to a consideration of this attempt in relation to its historical antecedents. Our first task must be to evaluate the claim, which found considerable favor among some Kant scholars in the last century, that the Groundwork's formulation of the moral principle was consciously based on a particular ancient text, which was well known and influential in Kant's day, namely Cicero's treatise On Duties. We're no better off regarding the systematic connection between Kant's formulas.
Kant probably began composing the
Although the quotations cited by Reich all occur within a relatively short space of text, as do the three formulas developed in the Second Section of the Groundwork, there is no suggestion in Cicero that these particular sayings constitute a single system defining the foundations of moral duty. On the contrary, they occur, along with many other thoughts, as part of Cicero's wide-ranging rhetorical argument in Book Three, whose main thesis is that there can never really be any conflict between rectitude or honor and mere expediency, but rather that the expedient or advantageous thing to do must always be the same as the right or dutiful thing to do (Cicero, On Duties, 3.4). 18 On this point, however, far from its being true that Kant might have been inspired by Cicero, it would be no exaggeration to say that the emphatic repudiation of Cicero's thesis is one of the most persistent themes throughout the entire Groundwork. Yet it is hard to convince oneself even that Kant was setting out to argue against Cicero in particular here. For in the Groundwork there are no references to Cicero's defense of this thesis, and no discernible attempt to address any of his particular arguments in favor of it.
Thus looking at the matter from every point of view, and even supposing for the sake of argument Reich is correct in conjecturing (on the basis of no real evidence worthy of the name) that Kant had Cicero's treatise in mind while he was composing the Since Kant's moral philosophy would seem to be sitting right in the bull's-eye of the target at which such polemics are aimed, it might surprise their proponents to learn that he accepts the historical side of their contentions, at least up to a point. 20 According to Kant, the question of "the basis of morality" which asks about "the principle of morality," "has been investigated in the modern age" (Lectures on Ethics 29:620). In place of this, by contrast, he says, the ancients asked about the summum bonum, the highest good (Lectures on Ethics 27: 247, 29:599; cf. Practical Reason 5:111ff.).
Kant's Critique of Previous Attempts to Discover the Supreme Principle of Morality
Ancient ethics: "The ideal". In Kant's view, the highest good was conceived by the ancient schools in a variety of ways. All of them were oriented primarily to "the ideal¸" that is, the "pattern, idea or archetype" of what a human being can be. For some (but not all) of the ancients, the ideal was also associated with a conception of happiness.
Among the ancients, Kant distinguishes the following theories of the ideal:
1. The Cynic ideal (of Diogenes and Antisthenes), which is natural simplicity, and happiness as the product of nature rather than of art.
2. The Epicurean ideal, which is that of the man of the world, and happiness as a product of art, not of nature.
3. The Stoic ideal (of Zeno), which is that of the sage, and happiness as identical with moral perfection or virtue.
4.
The mystical ideal (of Plato), of the visionary character, in which the highest good consists in the human being seeing himself in communion with the highest being.
The Christian ideal of holiness, whose pattern is Jesus Christ. (Lectures on
Ethics 27:247-250; 29:602-604).
The first three ideals place the incentive to morality in happiness, but the last two do not Analytic principles. Kant considers several ethical principles that he rejects because they attempt to pass off an analytic judgment as if it were more than that:
1. Do good and avoid evil. (Wolff).
2. Act according to the truth (Cumberland).
Act according to the mean between vices (Aristotle). (Lectures on Ethics
27:264, 276-277).
'Do good and avoid evil' is trivial because the concept of a good action is simply that of an action that is to be done, and the concept of an evil action is that of one that is to be omitted. The principle attributed here to Richard Cumberland is actually one that is held, in various forms, by virtually all adherents of the British rationalist tradition in ethics, including Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, William Wollaston and Richard Price. 22 It holds that actions have a real nature, and are involved with real relations to things and to other actions. In virtue of these natures and relations, it is true of some actions that they are right or to be done, and of others that they are wrong and to be avoided. Presumably
Kant's criticism of the principle that one should act in accordance with such truths is that this principle actually says no more than Wolff's principle does (for it tells us only to perform those actions of which it is true that they are right and ought to be performed). It is curious that Kant should have listed Aristotle's principle of the mean along with principles of the moderns, and curious also that Aristotle finds no place in Kant's account of the ancient schools. But his criticism is no doubt that, like Wolff's principle, it tells us only to do those actions that fall under the concept 'to be done'.
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Principles of Heteronomy: Kant's taxonomy. Kant criticizes the moral principles proposed by previous philosophers by characterizing them as 'heteronomous' in contrast to his own principle of autonomy (in the form of FA). In the Groundwork, his taxonomy of such principles distinguishes, "rational" principles from "empirical" principles; in the Critique of Practical Reason, the same distinctions are made, but this time between "determining grounds" of moral principles, and the distinction is between "objective" (instead of "rational") and "subjective" (instead of "empirical") grounds.
There, each of these groupings is further divided, in a way that cuts across this first distinction, into "external" and "internal" grounds. To make the moral principle happiness or moral feeling is to treat the desire for happiness or moral sentiments of approval and disapproval as the ground for complying with these principles. Theological ethics, making God's will the moral principle, treats either fear or love of God as the ground of morality, while the principle of perfection takes the value of perfection as our ground for following the principle.
Kant's critique of principles of heteronomy. The shift is also significant because Kant's critique of these alternative principles, both in the Groundwork and elsewhere, also focuses essentially on issues raised by these grounds for following them. Crucial to Kant's criticism of these alternative principles is his claim that each of them takes some object of the will as the determining ground of the rule that is to govern the will. The principle of education takes the imitation of examples as such an object, the principle of civil constitution, the fear of the sovereign's sanctions, the principle of physical feeling takes the enjoyment of pleasure, the principle of moral feeling takes the feeling of approbation (or the avoidance of feelings of disapprobation), the theological principle takes conformity to God's will, the principle of perfection takes the achievement of perfection. But, Kant argues, if the determining ground is an object of the will, then the imperative grounded on it can be only hypothetical, since the validity of the imperative for the will is conditional on achieving that object:
"Wherever an object of the will is to be taken as the ground in order to prescribe the rule determining that will, there the rule is nothing but heteronomy; the imperative is conditioned, namely: if or because one wills this object, one ought to act thus or so; hence it can never command morally, i.e. categorically" (Groundwork 4:444).
This argument needs to be understood against the background of what Kant thinks he has already established in the Groundwork, namely, that if morality is not a mere cobweb of the brain, then its supreme principle is a categorical imperative, and such a principle can be comprehended, in its most developed and universal form, as autonomy of the will (FA). The ultimate value on which this principle rests is the dignity of the rational will as capable of giving universal law to itself and to all other rational wills. The advantage of the principle of autonomy is that it enables us to conceive the validity of the moral principle as independent of any object of the will. All objects of the will (such as the "ideals" of ancient ethics, or their conceptions of happiness, or any of the objects providing the determining grounds involved in the taxonomy of modern ethical principles) are thereby shown to be inadequate grounds for morality, in contrast to the principle of autonomy, which alone can be made consistent with the idea of a categorical imperative.
Once the force of this argument is appreciated, it is easy to understand why partisans of the various ethical principles Kant rejects should react to it by attempting to discredit the very concept of a categorical imperative. For in light of this argument, that concept seems to set up a hurdle that their favorite principle can never jump. The most obvious first reaction is therefore to criticize the demand itself as unreasonable and the concept supporting it as nonsensical. However, contrary to this first reaction, we can see fairly easily that none of these theories turns for its defensibility on the question whether the notion of a categorical imperative makes sense. For, as I will now argue, those principles that must hold that it does not are indefensible even if we reject that notion, while the rest can, contrary to Kant's contention, meet his demand that they be understood as categorical imperatives. Empiricist theories, namely, are hopeless even apart from Kant's criticisms, while rationalist theories are quite defensible against them.
The strategy of denying that the notion of a categorical imperative makes sense is the only one available to those defending empirical principles, or subjective determining grounds for the moral principle. For they are committed to saying that in the end, the only reason we can give for following the moral principle is that we are so built by nature that we have certain desires (to imitate others, to avoid the sanctions that the sovereign might impose, to feel pleasure). Or at most, they can say that we are so built that we count Yet the problem with such views seems to me to go even deeper than Kant's criticism reveals. For even if we do not insist that moral principles are categorical imperatives, we ought at least to insist that there must be some genuine reason (categorical or not) for us to follow them, and none of the empirical theories seem consistent with meeting even that minimal requirement. For the fact that we are so built that we desire something does not give us a reason to desire it, nor a reason to satisfy the desire that we may have for it. Nor does the fact that we are so built that we take some feeling to be a reason for doing something amount to there really being a reason for us to do it. For as rational beings, we are also so built that we are capable of requiring genuine
reasons for doing what we do, and also capable of recognizing bogus substitutes for reasons as bogus. 25 (If it takes 'metaphysics' to acknowledge that there are genuine reasons, then that is about as good a defense as 'metaphysics' could ever hope for, since then it would then be self-contradictory for anyone to claim they had a genuine reason to reject 'metaphysics'.) The empirical theories are therefore indefensible even apart from the Kantian worry that they cannot treat moral principles as categorical imperatives.
The rational principles are not so badly off. In fact, I do not think that rationalists necessarily need to attack the idea of a categorical imperative in order to save themselves from Kant's criticism. Theological moralists (at least a certain kind of rationalistically minded theological moralist) may say that we are obligated to obey the divine will because that will is perfect, and hence what it wills or commands really is right in itself, independently of whether or not obeying the command achieves any further object of the will. But, if we allow the notion of a categorical imperative, then that is just to say that the commands of a perfect (divine) will are categorical imperatives. Likewise, a defender of the principle of perfection may say that this principle means only that we have a reason to act according to the idea of a perfect will, simply because perfection of will is intrinsically good --again quite apart from whether so acting achieves any other object.
That allows the perfectionists to say that their principles are categorical imperatives (again, if assuming we accept the idea of a categorical imperative). The British rationalist variant of this is that we are obligated to do those actions whose nature marks them out as right or to be done, while we are obligated to refrain from those actions whose nature makes them wrong or not to be done. 26 Again, the reason for doing and refraining lies in the nature of the actions themselves, and is not dependent on whether the doing or refraining achieves any other object of the will. There is nothing in this that is inconsistent with regarding the principle of morality as a categorical imperative.
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Ancient "ideal" theories of ethics may be defended in the same way, as long as their ideals are interpreted in a rationalist rather than an empiricist way. This is perhaps unpromising for the Epicurean ideal (and probably also for the Cynic ideal) since they seek either worldly virtue (or natural simplicity) as means to happiness, but can in principle give no account of why we have a genuine reason to want to be happy. But it seems quite possible for the Stoic, mystical (or Platonic) and Christian ideals to be framed in terms that are compatible with understanding morality as grounded on a categorical imperative. With the ancients, then as with the moderns: rationalism is defensible, empiricism, indefensible, whether or not we decide the notion of a categorical imperative makes sense.
Thus we arrive at the following conclusion concerning Kant's critique of the conceptions of the supreme principle of morality that preceded his own in the history of ethics: Kant is right in rejecting empirical moral principles, but he does not need to assume the idea of a categorical imperative in order to do so, for they are quite hopeless even apart from that idea; on the other hand, his arguments do not necessarily discredit rational moral principles, since these can be so understood that they can be just as easily brought into harmony with the idea of a categorical imperative as can Kant's own principle of autonomy.
Notes
1 No doubt these radical-sounding thoughts are sufficiently titillating, and have sufficient resonance with many frustrating practical dilemmas and intractable moral disagreements that trouble us, that some peoplel find in them enough appeal to be worth a defense. To most sober-minded people, however, the appeal of such thoughts does not last long, because the apparently exciting new vistas they appear to offer moral thinking turn out to be far less liberating than they at first seemed to be, once they have surveyed with even minimal care and seriousness. In any case, our inquiry here must begin with the recognition that Kant's reflection on morality begins with their resolute rejection.
2 There are false negatives whenever we are dealing with a maxim (such as: "Give more to charity than the average person does") that does not violate universal moral laws, but could not itself be made into a law without contradiction. 5 It is the prior setting of an end as the condition of the imperative's validity for me that makes the imperative hypothetical in Kant's sense. "If you make a promise, keep it." is not a hypothetical imperative because the if-clause does not refer to an end that conditions the validity of the imperative. Likewise, categorical imperatives are categorical because their validity is not conditional on some end. A moral imperative may be conditional in other ways -for instance, there may be implied conditions that release us from a promise, in which case there is no categorical imperative at all to keep it under those conditionsbut a valid moral imperative is always categorical in the sense that its rational validity does not depend on some prior setting of an end. The word 'prior' is crucial here, since categorical imperatives, in commanding us to act, also thereby always command us to set ends (according to Kant's theory, our own perfection and the happiness of others are the kinds of ends that are also duties). The thought that categorical imperatives command us to act without having any end at all is a nonsensical thought. 6 Since for Kant every action has an end to be produced, following a moral principle will always involve setting and achieving some end -for instance, fulfilling a promise will involve accomplishing the thing you promised to do. So it is just plain silly to represent Kantian ethics as caring nothing about the consequences of our actions -as is commonly done by those who don't understand the first thing about Kant's ethics, such as John Dewey (Human Nature and Conduct [1922] [New York: Random House, 1957], pp. 245-247). Nor do Kantian principles preclude using hypothetical reasoning about consequences -for instance, what would happen if anyone were permitted to make a promise without intending to keep it -from figuring in the reasoning that justifies the moral principle (ignoring this point frequently leads to a charge of inconsistency against Kant, as in Dewey, op. cit., p. 246.) The point is rather only that the validity of a moral principle, such as 'Keep your promises' is not dependent on the actual achievement of any particular end to be produced by following the principle. Such criticisms of Kant are more often symptoms of an inconsistent procedure on the part of the critics. Starting from the mistaken idea that all practical reasoning is instrumental in nature, and inferring from this that all moral reasoning must be justified by the particular consequences of the action, philosophers then see that there are clear counterexamples to this consequence. So they try to save their original dogma by appealing not to actual consequences but to the expected consequences of a principle's being generally followed or to the imagined consequences of its being followed or not followed under certain ideal counterfactual circumstances (in other words, using the same kind of reasoning that Kant uses). They then conclude that maybe there is something right in Kant's theory after all (see Dewey, op. cit., pp. 246-247); but they erroneously regard it as consistent with their own dogma that all practical reasoning is instrumental and oriented toward actual consequences, and inconsistent with Kantian principles. But the incoherence is in their views, not in Kant's.
7 This triad represents the three conditions Kant places on concept formation, with the third condition applying only to the concepts of individuals. "Form" refers to the kind of generality involved in a concept, created by the understanding according to the judgment-forms and categories; "matter," to the intuitive content or possibility of providing a sensible object for a concept. "Complete determination" means that for every pair of contradictory predicates, one and only one of them belongs to the concept. When a concept is completely determined, it is (according to Leibnizian doctrine) the concept of an individual rather than a universal concept. which I am calling attention. It is true that the original text can be read so that it does not positively exclude the possibility that each of the three formulas unites the other two. If I say of the three musketeers: "One of them would give his life for the other two," it is natural to understand me to be saying not only of one specific musketeer but of each of the three, Athos, of Porthos and Aramis, that he would give his life for his two comrades. But this is only because we have no reason to single out any one of them as more selfsacrificing than the other two, and so we have reason to treat "one" in this context as meaning "each one". However, in the Groundwork Kant has already singled out FA by saying that it follows from FUL and FH, but he has not made any comparable claim about either FUL or FH. So it is not natural to read "one" (die eine) here as if it were equivalent to "each" (jede or irgend eine). If Kant had meant jede or irgend eine, he could have said so. The (mis)reading of the passage is normally used to suggest, at the outset, a kind of equality of status between the three formulas, but usually this is nothing but a front for the common reading which privileges FUL over the other two formulas. That in turn usually goes along with treating FUL as a universal moral criterion, or interpreting it as a procedure for "constructing" the entire content of ethics, or a lot of other false and philosophically indefensible notions that fundamentally misunderstand Kant's moral philosophy.
problem with empiricist theories is that when presented with this obvious point, the empiricists won't admit it. When you ask them to tell you what reasons we have for doing anything, and insist that they give you some answer that at least has the general form of being a genuine reason, they get all nervous and huffy and accuse you of metaphysics, obscurantism, and god knows what other misdemeanors. Accepting their theories apparently requires us either to stop asking for reasons at all or else to allow to count as reasons things that are transparently not genuine reasons at all. Such defensiveness is a sure sign that there is something deeply wrong with their position, and that at some level, they know it. 26 Of course it is reasonable to ask the rationalist what these properties are, whether they are natural or nonnatural properties, how we can know about them, and so forth. And it may be that their theories about these matters fall far short of being satisfactory. But at least their account of what reasons are has the virtue that what it says are reasons might actually be reasons. (That an action is right or good or ought to be done is a reason for doing it, whereas the fact that we are disposed to desire something is transparently not a reason for desiring it and that we are disposed to approve of something is transparently not a reason for approving it.) Some Kantians who like to call themselves 'constructivists' think either that Kant has a superior theory to the rationalists on these points, or else at any rate that inspired by Kant, they have devised a superior theory. I think they are fooling themselves about this. Kant was perhaps a constructivist about mathematics is some intelligible sense, but no intelligible sense has yet been given to the term "Kantian constructivism" in ethics. As far as I can see, Kant has no better metaethical theory than the rationalists do, perhaps because he was interested only marginally, if at all, in the questions such theories are designed to answer. 
